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Law, eThicS, aNd ecoNoMicS of aTTorNeY coNTiNgeNT fee arraNgeMeNTS
A New Yorker asked Wm. M. Evarts what he would charge for managing a certain 
law case. “Well,” said Mr. Evarts, “I will take your case on a contingent fee.” “And 
what is a contingent fee?” “My dear sir,” said Mr. Evarts, mellifluously, “I will tell 
you what a contingent fee to a lawyer means. If I don’t win your suit I get nothing. 
If I do win it you get nothing. See?”1
The man looked at the check he received after winning his suit against the city. 
“Wait a minute!” he said to his attorney. “This is only a third of the full amount!” 
“That’s right,” said the attorney. “I took the rest.” “You!” screamed the man. “I was 
the one who was hurt!” “You forget. I provided the intelligence required to build the 
case, the expertise to find precedents, and the oratory to convince the jury. Any 
asshole could fall down a manhole.”2
 Contingent compensation arrangements for legal representation are as ubiquitous 
as they are controversial. Proponents argue that such arrangements increase poor 
persons’ access to the courts, decrease frivolous litigation, and are structured to 
maximize client welfare. Opponents disagree with all but the first claim, and assert 
that contingent fees vastly overcompensate rapacious attorneys and create perverse 
incentives. Traditionally the province of lawyers and ethicists, economists and 
economically minded legal scholars have recently weighed in, resulting in a 
burgeoning corpus of economic analysis. Despite this surge of attention from both 
scholars and an often angry public, little has changed in contingent fee practice.
 This article will critically survey the contingent fee landscape. First, it collects 
and discusses the law and literature on all major aspects of contingent arrangements, 
presenting a unified, singular reference point on the subject. Second, it critically 
analyzes that law and scholarship, indicating where errors have been made and 
suggesting ways to correct them.
 Part I introduces the contingent fee arrangement, its history and justifications, 
and reports on average hourly compensation thereunder. Part II canvasses general 
rules governing such arrangements. Part III discusses and proposes significant 
changes in the use (or lack thereof) of contingent fees in criminal, domestic relations, 
and corporate matters. Part IV seeks to rectify misconceptions concerning risk and 
agency, the core economic themes underlying the contingent fee. Part V suggests and 
examines various proposals to reform unreasonable and uncompetitive contingent fee 
pricing. Part VI considers the empirical question of whether contingent arrangements 
promote litigation, and the normative question of whether it matters if they do.
1. Mark Twain et al., Wit and Humor of the Age: Comprising Wit, Humor, Pathos, Ridicule, 
Satires, Dialects, Puns, Conundrums, Riddles, Charades, Jokes and Magic 386–87 (Chicago 
Star Publ’g Co. 1883).
2. Jeff Rovin, 500 Great Lawyer Jokes 40 (1992). For an analysis of these jokes see Marc Galanter, 
Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and its Discontents, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 457 
(1998).
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i. intrOdUCtiOn tO COntingEnt fEE arrangEMEnts
 A. Definition
 An attorney-client fee arrangement is “contingent” if the attorney’s compensation 
depends, in any part, on success in the representation. There are many variants of 
such arrangements, though from a thematic perspective, three emerge: (1) a lawyer is 
paid a fixed hourly rate or specified sum based on the number of hours worked, but 
only if successful;3 (2) a lawyer charges a f lat or hourly fee, with a bonus accruing to 
her if she is successful; or (3) a lawyer is paid only a percentage of any recovery 
obtained for the client. In the first and third arrangements, the lawyer’s compensation 
is predicated on success, with no pecuniary benefit redounding to her in its absence. 
The most controversy, and the bulk of scholarly discussion, concerns the third 
arrangement.4
 Today, percentage-based contingent fees generally range from 33% to 50% of the 
client’s award.5
 B. Historical Development and Justifications
 The story of the contingent fee is but a subplot of the American narrative of 
creative economic development and social progressivism. In the Middle Ages, a 
contingent fee arrangement “was not only void, but constituted . . . the [criminal] 
offense of champerty.”6 This was, in part, because “to acquire a share in such a claim 
is essentially a speculation and in the Middle Ages [was] tainted with the discredit 
which attached to every form of speculation.”7 In the United States, over time, the 
contingent fee “won a grudging acceptance as a ‘necessary evil.’”8 And, by 1858, one 
high court, referring to the contingent fee, noted that “[w]hat was before not only 
illegal but disreputable is now lawful, if not respectable.”9
3. Some scholars refer to this arrangement as “conditional,” reserving the label “contingent” for the third 
variant. See, e.g., Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Two Cheers for Contingent Fees 6 
(Michael S. Greve ed., AEI Press 2005).
4. Not all portions of this article’s analysis will apply to each of these scenarios.
5. Lester Brickman et al., Rethinking Contingency Fees 13 (1994). The percentage usually depends 
on the stage of litigation at which the case terminates. See id.
6. Max Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 Cal. L. Rev. 587, 587 (1940). Champerty is “[a]n 
agreement between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the intermeddler helps 
pursue the litigant’s claim as consideration for receiving part of any judgment proceeds.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 246 (8th ed. 2004).
7. Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 Cal. L. Rev. 48, 69 (1935–1936). See generally Peter Karsten, 
Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, a History to 
1940, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 231 (1998) (discussing contingent fees since the Middle Ages).
8. Louis P. Contiguglia & Cornelius E. Sorapure, Jr., Comment, Lawyer’s Tightrope—Use and Abuse of 
Fees, 41 Cornell L. Q. 683, 685 (1955–1956).
9. Rooney v. Second Ave. R.R. Co., 18 N.Y. 368, 373 (1858). The Supreme Court expressed approval of 
contingent fees around the same time. See Wylie v. Coxe, 56 U.S. 415, 420 (1853).
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 When evaluating the regulation of contingent fees, one must also consider 
evolving views of the legal profession. “Early lawyers in Great Britain viewed the law 
as a form of public service, rather than as a means of earning a living, and they 
looked down on ‘trade’ as unseemly.”10 In the United States, that quixotic view has 
shifted, though not completely, toward an acknowledgement that the attorney is also 
a tradesperson, concerned with earning a living.11 Conflicting ethical precepts often 
reflect the tension between the view of an attorney as a fiduciary and public servant, 
and the view of an attorney as a businessperson.12
 There are four principal policy justifications for contingent fee arrangements. 
First, such arrangements enable the impecunious to obtain representation. Such 
persons cannot afford the costs of litigation unless and until it is successful. Even 
members of the middle- and upper-socioeconomic classes may find it difficult to pay 
legal fees in advance of success and collection of judgment. This is particularly so 
today as litigation has become more complex, often involving suits against multiple 
parties or multinational entities, and concerning matters requiring expert scientific 
and economic evidence. Second, contingent fee arrangements can help align the 
interests of lawyer and client, as both will have a direct financial stake in the outcome 
of the litigation. Third, by predicating an attorney’s compensation on the success of 
a suit, the attorney is given incentive to function as gatekeeper, screening cases for 
both merit and sufficiency of proof, and lodging only those likely to succeed.13 
Fourth, and more generally, all persons of sound mind should be permitted to 
contract freely, and restrictions on contingent fee arrangements inhibit this 
freedom.14
10. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977).
11. Id. at 371–72 (“[T]he belief that lawyers are somehow ‘above’ trade has become an anachronism . . . .”).
12. “This schizophrenia is the source of a permanent division in our thinking about the legal profession, 
and many of the most familiar dilemmas of legal ethics, which can be restated with endless variety but 
never really solved, trace their origins to it.” Anthony T. Kronman, A Nation Under Lost Lawyers: The 
Legal Profession at the Close of the Twentieth Century: The Fault in Legal Ethics, 100 Dick. L. Rev. 489, 
493 (1996).
13. Implicit in this rationale is the belief that lawyers are better than clients at gatekeeping. Lawyers can be 
better gatekeepers than many clients because lawyers have more knowledge of the legal merit of claims 
and the likelihood of success in or out of court. See Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving 
on the Contingent Fee, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 529, 571 (1978).
14. See, e.g., Comm’rs on Practice and Pleadings, First Report of the Commissioners on Practice 
and Pleadings: Code of Procedure 204–05 (Comm’rs on Practice and Pleadings ed., 1848) (“We 
cannot perceive the right of the state, to interfere between citizens, and fix the compensation which one 
of them shall receive from the other, for his skill and labor . . . . Freedom of industry is one of the 
strongest demands of the time. This includes not only the right of each citizen to engage, at will, in any 
honest calling, but to receive such rewards as he can agree for it.”). See generally Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating statutory restriction prohibiting parties from contracting for labor 
exceeding specified time limits).
777
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 54 | 2009/10
 C. The Role of Reputation
 Throughout this article, the effects of and incentives created by contingent fees 
are assessed. While the discussion does not always refer to reputational concerns, 
these must be considered at every step. An attorney’s concern for her reputation often 
provides incentive to perform well and act responsibly toward her client, and can 
mitigate the potential harm caused by perverse incentives attending fee 
arrangements.
 Nonetheless, there is still good reason to be concerned with such perverse 
incentives. First, clients, particularly unsophisticated ones, may be unable to determine 
when an attorney has underperformed or acted irresponsibly;15 in these instances, an 
attorney’s reputation would be unaffected, and thus the risk of reputational harm 
would not adequately protect against malfeasance. Second, even when clients are 
aware of an attorney’s poor performance or irresponsibility, they may lack the means, 
media, or credibility to effectively harm the attorney’s reputation. Third, the interests 
of attorney and client are more closely aligned, ceteris paribus, when fee arrangements 
are structured so as to minimize perverse incentives.
 D. Average Hourly Compensation Under the Contingent Fee
 It is hard to measure actual average hourly compensation of contingent fee 
attorneys in the absence of contemporary and statistically sufficient information 
regarding the number of hours they work and the economic results of that labor. 
Such figures are generally unreported. However, a few studies have been undertaken. 
The first is a 1980 study by the Civil Litigation Research Project focusing on a 
sample of cases from South Carolina, Philadelphia, New Mexico, Milwaukee, and 
Los Angeles.16 While the mean hourly rate of compensation for contingency lawyers 
was $89, the median was $43.17 The median hourly rate for non-contingency fee 
15. The sophisticated client is in a superior position to leverage reputational concerns to his or her benefit. 
Sophisticated clients are repeat legal consumers and have more knowledge of the legal market and the 
value of their claims and the services they seek than do plebeian consumers. An attorney who performs 
well and maintains a positive reputation is most likely to garner additional business from the sophisticated 
client. An attorney who performs poorly or bills unethically is likely to be caught and lose repeat 
business. See Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gomez-Pomar, Cashing by the Hour: Why Large Law Firms 
Prefer Hourly Fees Over Contingent Fees, 24 J. L. Econ. & Org. 458, 471 (2008).
16. Herbert M. Kritzer, What Are Contingency Fees Really Like?, 12–13 (Mar. 15–16, 2002) (unpublished), 
available at http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzner/research/contfee/ilep.pdf (citing David M. Trubek 
et al., Civil Litigation Research Project Final Report: Part C 52-59, at 78 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Law School 1987)).
17. Id. The mean is the numerical average of all values in a set. The mean can obscure reality, though. For 
instance, if nine lawyers earn $10 per hour, and one earns $1000 per hour, the mean hourly compensation 
for all ten lawyers is $109 each, even though nine of the ten attorneys earn far less than this amount, and 
one earns substantially more. A more accurate picture is obtained by considering, in addition to the 
mean, the median, which may indirectly measure, in some degree, the most common grouping of 
compensation.
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lawyers in this study was $50.18 In the second study, based on Herbert Kritzer’s 
extensive surveys of Wisconsin attorneys coupled with data from a Rand Corporation 
study, the mean and median hourly rates of non-contingency attorneys were within 
the range of $125 to $140, while contingent fee attorneys averaged $169 (with the 
median being lower; when the top 5% of earners were dropped, the mean hourly rate 
for contingent fee attorneys dropped to $137).19
 Lester Brickman, critical of Kritzer’s methodology, data, and conclusions, 
responded with other data indicating that contingent hourly rates were much higher 
than Kritzer reported.20 One source of such data is an analysis by the Congressional 
Joint Economic Committee, which found that of the $16.74 billion paid to attorneys 
in auto injury cases in 2001, 71% (or $11.93 billion) was paid to plaintiffs’ attorneys 
and 29% (or $4.82 billion) to defense attorneys.21 Brickman also noted that even if 
Kritzer’s conclusion was true—that contingency-fee lawyers earn hourly rates 
comparable to those earned by hourly rate attorneys—the financial incentives that 
both drive plaintiffs’ lawyers and make it profitable for defendants to adopt 
intransigent settlement postures lead to intolerably high transaction costs and a 
dysfunctional—and sometimes extortionate—tort system.22
 At the very least, the studies by Kritzer and the Civil Litigation Research Project 
indicate that popular belief about what contingent fee attorneys earn per hour, fueled 
by reports of uncommon but attention-grabbing profits, may not be correct. More 
empirical analysis is necessary.23
ii. gEnEraL rULEs gOVErning COntingEnt fEE arrangEMEnts
 A. Advisory Rules
 Contingent fees have, for some time, been subject to advisory rules, though the 
regulation they provide is rather generic and thin. It has remained the province of 
official commentaries, opinions, and the common law to construct an edifice of 
comprehensive regulation and guidance upon this minimalist foundation.
18. Herbert M. Kritzer, Risks, Reputations, and Rewards: Contingency Fee Legal Practice in 
the United States 184 (2004).
19. Id. at 188–90. This suggests that a small percentage of attorneys earn very large fees.
20. See generally Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and 
Non-Competitive Fees, 81 Wash. U. L. Q. 653 (2003).
21. Staff of Joint Econ. Comm., 108th Cong., Choice in Auto Insurance: Updated Savings 
Estimates for Auto Choice 14–19 (Comm. Print 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/
tort/07-24-03.pdf. It is unclear to what extent, if any, a plaintiff ’s obligation to bear the burden of proof 
is responsible for a portion of the larger fees charged by, and paid to, plaintiffs’ attorneys.
22. Brickman, supra note 20, at 665. Brickman’s point is important. Simply comparing contingency and 
non-contingency hourly rates does not give one a sense of whether either is fair relative to some alternate 
legal universe. Prices, after all, can be similar yet inf lated.
23. “I suspect that, barring a massive investment of research dollars, the question of how much the typical 
contingency fee attorney earns per hour will always be controversial . . . .” Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches 
from the Tort Wars, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1465, 1491 (2007).
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 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) promulgated the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility (“Model Code”) in 1969.24 In 1983, the ABA adopted 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”).25 On their own, these 
rules are not mandatory authority in any jurisdiction. Instead, they serve as models 
for individual states to adopt (with or without modification), and as suggested 
guideposts for ethical behavior.
 The Model Rules prohibit a lawyer from charging an “unreasonable fee.”26 In 
making the fact-sensitive determination of whether a fee is unreasonable, relevant 
considerations include “the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,”27 as 
well as “whether the fee is fixed or contingent.”28
 In 1998, the American Law Institute adopted the Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers (the “Restatement”). The Restatement provides that, unless 
the fee is unreasonable, “a lawyer may contract with a client for a fee the size or 
payment of which is contingent on the outcome of a matter.”29
 B. State Rules
 Most states have adopted either the Model Code or the Model Rules, usually 
with minor variation.30 Some, however, have made more substantial modification.
 Florida, for instance, extensively regulates contingent fees, particularly in personal 
injury suits, where specific permissible percentages of attorney compensation are 
delineated based on the amount of recovery and stage of litigation in which the suit 
terminates. These percentages constitute presumptive (yet rebuttable) ceilings on 
reasonable contingent fees.31 For example, “[i]f all defendants admit liability at the 
time of filing their answers and request a trial only on damages,” the presumptive 
ceilings are lower than they would be if liability were contested.32 Hawaii added to 
the Model Rules a requirement that in determining whether a contingent fee is 
24. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Preface (1969), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/
mcpr.pdf.
25. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Preface (1983), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/
preface.html.
26. Id. at R. 1.5(a).
27. Id. at 1.5(a)(1).
28. Id. at 1.5(a)(8).
29. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers: Contingent-Fee Arrangements § 35 
(2000).
30. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form of the Model Rules. Center for 
Professional Responsibility, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, State Adoption of Model Rules, 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). California has adopted 
its own rules. Id.
31. See Rules Regulating the Florida Bar: Rules of Prof’l Conduct § 4-1.5(f) (2010).
32. See id. at § 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(i)(b)–(c).
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reasonable, one should consider “the risk of no recovery and the conscionability of 
the fee in light of the net recovery to the client.”33
 An alternative source of attorney conduct regulation is general state “fiduciary 
duty” doctrine. An attorney may breach a fiduciary duty to her client if she attempts 
to collect an unreasonable or unconscionable fee.34 Noting that disciplinary complaints 
against lawyers based on contingent fee abuses “virtually never result in disciplinary 
action against the lawyers,” Brickman reports two cases where clients successfully 
sued their attorneys, based on contingent fee abuses, under a theory of breach of 
fiduciary duty.35
 C. Examples of Federal Law
 Generally, state law governs the availability and propriety of attorney-client fee 
arrangements.36 Nonetheless, federal law and court practice occasionally supplement 
or supplant state regulation.
  1. Federal Class Actions
 When a large number of potential plaintiffs have fairly identical claims against 
the same defendant(s), the class action device may be used to consolidate all claims 
and parties into a single litigation. Once consolidated, the court appoints lead counsel 
to represent the class of plaintiffs. Class action lawsuits foster judicial economy. 
Rather than having hundreds of duplicative lawsuits prosecuted and defended in 
different courts, the parties and claims come together in one forum for final 
determination. Additionally, class actions “protect plaintiffs’ rights and promote 
accountability by permitting dispersed, disorganized plaintiffs who may have suffered 
only small injuries to find redress by acting as a group where they would lack 
sufficient incentive to do so individually.”37
 Class action lawsuits often involve large sums of money, and raise interesting 
issues of attorney appointment and emolument. Often, when a class action lawsuit 
initially is filed, many plaintiffs represented by many different attorneys come 
forward seeking certification as lead plaintiff. Once an attorney’s client is appointed 
lead plaintiff, the attorney stands a fair chance of being appointed lead counsel. 
Attorneys clamor for the opportunity to be so appointed by the court and thus be 
assured a monopoly over potentially sizeable attorneys’ fees. Unlike smaller suits 
33. Hawaii Rules of Prof’l Conduct § 1.5(a)(8) (1994).
34. See Affiliated Computer Serv., Inc. v. Kasmir & Krage, L.L.P., No. 05-98-00227-CV, 2000 WL 
1702635, at *4 (Tex. App. Nov. 15, 2000).
35. Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 
247, 293 (1996). The cases reported by Brickman are Richfield v. Heuser & Carr, No. 92 CV 1797 slip 
op. (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 13, 1994) and Eich v. Gregory A. Maceau, P.C., No. 96 CA1354 slip op. (Colo. 
Ct. App. Nov. 28, 1997).
36. Geoffrey C. Hazard & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 66.6 (3d ed. 2001).
37. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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with fewer plaintiffs, class members often are bound by the court’s selection of lead 
counsel, and effectively lose the ability to be represented by counsel of their own 
choosing. Additionally, many class members will never be named in the action or 
appear in the litigation.38 Finally, the large number of class members and diffuse 
damages incurred may give few (if any) incentives to sufficiently monitor attorney 
conduct.39 Given the dynamics that strain the lawyer-client relationship, courts 
should, at least in theory, exercise greater oversight of fee awards in class action cases 
than in others. Indeed, in federal class actions involving monetary relief, judges must 
regulate and approve attorney fee arrangements and award amounts.40 Oversight is 
maintained in a variety of ways. For instance, some courts have revolutionized the 
way attorney compensation is set in class actions, using the process of selecting lead 
counsel as leverage. One example is the Auction Houses litigation, where the judge 
selected lead counsel through an auction in which firms bid downward on the 
percentage of the recovery they would seek if successful in the litigation.41
  2. Tax Practice
 In connection with practice before the United States Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”), “a practitioner may not charge a contingent fee for preparing an original tax 
return or for any advice rendered in connection with a position taken or to be taken 
on an original tax return.”42 However, a practitioner may do so in connection with an 
amended return or claim for refund, but only if she “reasonably anticipates at the 
time the fee arrangement is entered into that the amended tax return or refund claim 
will receive substantive review by the [IRS].”43 By requiring anticipation of substantive 
review, the IRS rules essentially necessitate a greater-than-nominal risk of non-
recovery to justify charging a contingent fee with a risk premium.
38. See Tobin D. Kern, Approval of a Class Action Settlement Under C.R.C.P. 23(E), 31 Colo. Law. 71, 71 
(2002) (“Unnamed class members typically have been absent from the case prior to settlement and thus 
are unable to monitor effectively the prosecution of their claims by class counsel and the class 
representatives. In fact, class members may not even learn of the litigation until their representatives 
propose a settlement.”); Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in 
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 991, 1043 n.273 (2002) (“The law 
of class actions recognizes the problem that the interests of class members not active in the litigation 
may not be adequately represented.”).
39. See Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 78.
40. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g); see also Manual for Complex Litigation § 14.1 (4th ed. 2004); Foster v. 
Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
41. See Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 72; see also In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990); 
In re Bank One S’holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
42. Treas. Dep’t, Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled 
Agents, Enrolled Actuaries, Enrolled Retirement Plan Agents, and Appraisers Before the Internal Revenue 
Service, Circ. No. 230 (Rev. Apr. 2008); see also 31 C.F.R. § 10.27 (2005).
43. Treas. Dep’t, supra note 42; see also 31 C.F.R. § 10.27 (2005).
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 D. Formal Requirements of Contingent Fee Arrangements
 States generally follow the Model Rules with respect to the formal requirements 
attending contingent fee agreements. Such agreements must be in writing, signed by 
the client, and state “[t]he scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee 
and expenses for which the client will be responsible.”44 In particular, the agreements 
shall state
the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or 
percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or 
appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and 
whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is 
calculated.45
The agreement also must list any expenses or fees that the client will be 
required to pay even if the case is unsuccessful.46 Upon conclusion, the lawyer 
must “provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the 
matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the 
method of its determination.”47
iii.  COntingEnt fEEs in dOMEstiC rELatiOns, CriMinaL, and COrpOratE 
MattErs
 There are two areas in which most governing authorities prohibit the use of 
contingent fees: criminal and certain domestic relations matters. Typical is ABA 
Model Rule 1.5(d), which states:
A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect: (1) any 
fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is 
contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or 
support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or (2) a contingent fee for 
representing a defendant in a criminal case.48
 A. Domestic Relations Matters
 The Supreme Court of Michigan adeptly stated the principal justification for the 
domestic relations ban over a hundred years ago:
Public policy is interested in maintaining the family relation. The interests of 
society require that those relations shall not be lightly severed, that families 
shall not be broken up for inadequate causes, or from unworthy motives; and 
where differences have arisen which threaten disruption, public welfare and 
the good of society demand a reconciliation, if practicable or possible.
44. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.5(b) (2004).
45. Id. at 1.5(c).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1.5(d).
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 Contracts like the one in question tend directly to prevent such 
reconciliation, and, if legal and valid, tend directly to bring around alienation 
of husband and wife by offering a strong inducement, amounting to a 
premium, to induce and advise the dissolution of the marriage ties as a method 
of obtaining relief from real or fancied grievances which otherwise would 
pass unnoticed.49
 While this justification is often bandied-about, there is little reported empirical 
data to support it.50 Even if valid, a similar objection can be lodged against many 
other contingent arrangements, and it seems anomalous that it should only prevail in 
the domestic relations context. Those who use the justification only in this context 
likely believe not just that the familial relation is sacrosanct, but that it occupies a 
rung on the ladder of social importance above contractual or partnership relations. 
Additionally, its proponents may believe that in domestic relations matters, the 
feuding spouses, by virtue of their matrimonial relationship, are more likely than 
unrelated parties to respond to alternatives to litigation. These positions, however, 
are not without controversy. First, some might posit that reconciliation is always a 
goal to be pursued, and fee arrangements always should be structured to promote it. 
From an economic perspective, reconciliation in other contexts may be more valuable, 
and failure to achieve it much more detrimental, than in matrimonial matters. 
Second, parties in domestic relations cases may be less amenable to alternatives to 
litigation. One could argue that given these parties’ close relationships, were 
reconciliation possible, it would surely have been attempted, if not achieved, before 
resort to adversarial litigation, and thus is unlikely to be achieved beyond that 
point.
 There are exceptions to the ban. Many jurisdictions permit contingent fees in 
domestic relations matters where divorce is a certainty, such as suits to enforce 
previously awarded but unfulfilled monetary support obligations.51 Oddly, as F.B. 
MacKinnon trenchantly observes, there is no exception that would allow the spouse 
attempting to prevent dissolution of the marriage to enter into a contingent fee 
arrangement.52 In this regard, the ban is overly broad in addressing its own possibly 
misguided policy rationale.
49. Jordan v. Westerman, 28 N.W. 826, 830 (Mich. 1886). Understanding that many women seeking 
divorce do not possess the funds necessary to pursue such an action, the court provided that “[i]n every 
suit, brought either for divorce or for a separation, the court may, in its discretion, require the husband 
to pay any sums necessary to enable the wife to carry on or defend the suit during its pendency.” Id. at 
829 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. In Kraus v. Naumburg, 36 Pa. D. & C.2d 746 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1965), the court stated that it was “satisfied 
that very few, if any, attorneys would think of discouraging the reconciliation of estranged spouses, and 
that any attorney who is so fee hungry as to do so would be as likely to do so for a fixed fee as for a 
contingent fee.” Id. at 755. This, of course, does not end the matter, and further study is necessary.
51. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Fletcher, 591 N.E.2d 91, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
52. F.B. MacKinnon, Contingent Fees for Legal Services: Professional Economics and 
Responsibilities 47 (n. prtg. 2008).
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 B. Criminal Cases
 Historically, prohibitions on contingent fees in criminal matters have been 
justified on the grounds that (1) such fees incentivize dishonesty and misconduct by 
attorneys, in particular by providing an attorney with incentive to discourage plea 
bargaining; (2) indigent defendants in criminal proceedings are provided free 
representation, obviating the need for contingent arrangements to ensure access to 
counsel; and, in any case; (3) success in a criminal action produces no fund from 
which to award fees.
 This “conventional” analysis, however, “is seriously incomplete.”53 First, 
contingent fees offer no greater incentive for attorney misconduct in criminal matters 
than in civil matters, although they are permitted in the latter. Second, perverse 
incentives, such as those to forgo plea-bargaining, can be minimized with properly 
structured arrangements. Third, while most successful criminal matters produce no 
fund for a fee award, prohibition ignores the possibility of reverse contingent fee 
arrangements.54 Success in a criminal matter may permit the client to retain funds 
otherwise removable by asset forfeiture or monetary fines, and may also allow the 
client to continue working so that additional funds can be procured. Legal fees could 
then be paid with these funds.55 Fourth, a guarantee of counsel—likely minimally 
compensated counsel—does not reduce the economic desirability of incentive 
structures in the form of bonuses.
 Pamela Karlan suggests subtler but more compelling reasons for prohibition. 
First, with payment contingent on success, lawyers will screen cases for merit. This 
can hamper effective, truthful communication between lawyer and client, as the 
latter has a direct economic incentive to sugarcoat the facts, and transforms “the 
lawyer into a mini-judge,” which may “deprive the defendant of his right to a zealous 
advocate.”56 While a similar objection may be lodged in the civil context, it is more 
meaningful in criminal adjudication because the criminal defendant, unlike the civil 
plaintiff, is an involuntary participant in the judicial system; as such, there is no 
gatekeeping function for the attorney to perform.57 Second, most persons charged 
with crimes either plead guilty or are convicted. As a result, lawyers cannot expect to 
construct a portfolio of all, or nearly all, winning cases. To make up for shortfalls in 
contingency cases caused by so many losers, lawyers would have to charge higher fees 
to clients with winning cases. “Clients with winning cases will subsidize the legal 
expenses of clients with losing cases.”58 It is thought that this practice is unfair and 
may be unethical.59
53. Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 595, 637 (1993).
54. For a discussion of reverse arrangements, see infra Part IV.C.3.
55. See Karlan, supra note 53, at 603.
56. See id. at 631–32.
57. See id. at 616.
58. Id. at 621.
59. This objection is not limited to the criminal context. It is explored more expansively infra Part IV.A.2.a.
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 These added reasons fail to justify a categorical ban. First, it is unclear how merit 
screening would reduce zealous advocacy. If a potential client’s case is deemed 
meritorious, the attorney should provide zealous representation. If the attorney 
refuses to take the case on contingency, then the client can obtain the zealous 
representation of fixed-fee or appointed counsel. Second, it is erroneous to assume 
that contingent fee lawyers will accept losing cases, thus presenting the opportunity 
to subsidize them. In reality, such subsidization rarely occurs, as attorneys are loath 
to accept risky cases.60 To the extent that attorneys refuse to accept on contingency 
clients with risky cases, or will only do so charging exorbitant risk premiums, such 
clients have the options of paying conventional hourly or f lat fees, or, if indigent, 
being appointed counsel at no charge. As lawyers tend to reject contingent 
representation in all but winning cases (and winning cases are a distinct minority), 
and instead charge conventional fees, market forces will have directed the same 
outcome as would result from a ban, albeit with two beneficial exceptions: clients 
who could afford hybrid hourly and bonus-like contingent fees, and clients with 
winning cases, would be able, if they deemed it helpful under their respective 
circumstances, to utilize these potentially economically useful arrangements. These 
options are precluded by an all-encompassing ban. It would also be unfair to prohibit 
such clients from utilizing contingent arrangements simply because some defendants, 
who have the option of non-contingent representation, may choose to be untruthful 
with their attorneys in order to obtain better representation. Thus, a ban on contingent 
fees for criminal defense attorneys is unnecessary and unjustified.
 Typically, the fee literature ignores, or only addresses in a brief and conclusory 
manner, contingent fees for the criminal prosecutor.61 Recall that Model Rule 1.5(d) 
does not even reference the matter, though the drafters likely would not countenance 
such an arrangement. This disregard only begs the question: If contingent fees should 
be permitted for criminal defendants, why prohibit prosecutors from being paid on 
contingency?62
 There are a number of objections to such a practice. First, unlike parties in a civil 
action63 and the defendant in a criminal action, the prosecutor is not simply an 
60. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.a.
61. See Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 441, 449 (2009) 
(referencing the “one law professor to write in this area”).
62. Since prosecutors occupy salaried positions, contingent fees, if permitted, would likely be in the form of 
bonuses.
63. Martin Redish argues that as an ethical and constitutional matter, attorneys representing the government 
in civil litigation should also be prohibited from being remunerated through contingent fees. See Martin 
H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: Constitutional and Political Implications 
(Northwestern Law, Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth, Working Paper 2008-
032), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/uploads/Redish_revised.pdf; see also 
Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9 Widener J. Pub. L. 235 
(2000). In his thorough discussion, Green calls attention to habeas corpus and certain enforcement 
cases, both of which, while civil, are imbued with criminal character. See Green, supra, at 244–46.
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adversary. The prosecutor has a duty to do justice.64 Conviction is sometimes, but not 
always, a proxy for doing justice. In some cases, justice involves not filing charges 
against an innocent person, dismissing a case against a defendant in light of new 
evidence, or exercising the discretion to not prosecute guilty persons based upon 
mitigating circumstances. Contingent fees should reward success, but in the context 
of criminal prosecution, success is not always clearly defined. Because success is 
doing justice, it may be impossible to determine, ex ante, what outcome justice 
requires, and thus what outcome a contingent fee should reward.65 Second, the 
consequences of contingent-fee-induced misconduct, even if such misconduct is rare, 
are unacceptably pernicious in the prosecutorial context.
 This second objection, while rich in historical support,66 may not be sound. For 
instance, if the risk of misconduct would result in innocent persons being convicted 
in a small number of cases, some might argue that the overall cost to society is 
acceptable—that the harm to those few individuals is less than the harm to society 
caused by failure to secure convictions against a large number of guilty persons. A 
more nuanced argument for the ban, borrowing from the lessons of act and rule 
utilitarianism,67 is that the possibility that an innocent person may be convicted, and 
the inability of any member of society to know if she might be that person, is a 
substantial harm (in the form of insecurity) to many persons, not just the innocent 
individual who ends up being convicted. The harm, then, is not just the wrongful 
conviction, which befalls a particular person, but the insecurity resulting from the 
risk of misconduct, which falls on everyone and may outweigh the harm to society of 
some guilty persons avoiding conviction. Even this argument is not f lawless; it still 
raises the possibility that at some point, the harm resulting from an innocent person’s 
conviction might not outweigh the harm caused by failure to convict a large number 
of guilty persons.68 Nonetheless, considering the difficulty in drawing this line and 
the problems identified earlier with regard to defining success, retaining the ban on 
contingent fees for criminal prosecutions is justified.
 C. Corporate Practice
 Contingent fees also exist in corporate practice. Frequently, fees in mergers and 
acquisitions transactions are tied to the success of a takeover, or alternatively, the 
64. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the representative not 
of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is 
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”).
65. Baca v. Padilla, 190 P. 730, 731 (N.M. 1920) (invalidating a contract for payment to private criminal 
prosecutor based on contingency, as “the size of his fee, or possibly whether he receive[s] any fee at all, 
would be dependent upon the conviction of the defendant, however innocent he might be”).
66. See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 173 (1997); People v. Galbo, 218 N.Y. 283, (1916).
67. See Donald C. Emmons, Act vs. Rule-Utilitarianism, 82 Mind 226, 226 (1973).
68. “[W]e must be on our guard against those sentimental exaggerations which tend to give crime impunity, 
under the pretext of insuring the safety of innocence.” William Twining, Theories of Evidence: 
Bentham & Wigmore 98 (1985).
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defeat of an unwanted takeover.69 Likewise, fees for public offerings are often pegged 
to whether the securities successfully come to market and to the amount generated in 
the offering.70
 The ABA approves of the use of contingent fee arrangements in non-litigation 
matters, subject to the same restrictions that are applicable in the litigation context.71 
While such arrangements do exist,72 little regulatory, judicial, or scholarly attention 
has been paid to them. This is probably because such matters are rarely, if ever, 
litigated, and because corporate clients are generally more sophisticated than 
contingent-fee-litigation clients, and thus less likely to be taken advantage of or 
otherwise agree to unfavorable contractual terms.
 The extension of contingent fee arrangements into the corporate context is 
commendable, though in some instances malapropos. For instance, Richard Painter 
argues that attorneys should not be compensated on contingency in securities 
transactions because the practice creates perverse incentives.73 “Counsel should be 
paid to ferret out problems with a transaction as well as to promote its virtues, and 
legal fees that depend so much on whether a deal closes undermine this objective.”74 
Understanding the potential influence of this perverse incentive, Warren Buffet once 
quipped that “[i]f I’m going to pay $5 million to somebody if they give me the advice 
and the deal goes through, then I think I probably ought to pay $5 million to 
somebody else whose advice I listen to who gets paid the $5 million only if the deal 
doesn’t go through.”75 In light of economic common sense and the experiences of the 
last decade, this advice should be heeded.
iV. risK and agEnCY in COntingEnt fEE arrangEMEnts
 A. Risk and Reasonableness
  1. The Concept of Risk
 Key to understanding contingent fee arrangements is appreciating the concept of 
risk. Generally, contingent fees may exceed hourly fees for the same work because an 
attorney must be compensated for accepting the risk that payment will be either 
69. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389 (1994).
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., Daniel Hertzberg & James Stewart, Contingency Legal Fee for Merger Breaks Ground, Stirs 
Controversy, Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1986, at 31, col. 4.
73. See The Role of Attorneys in Corporate Governance, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & 
Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Professor 
Richard W. Painter, Guy Raymond, and Mildred Van Vorhis Professor of Law, University of Illinois 
College of Law), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/020404rp.pdf.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 323, 
354 (2007) (internal quotation omitted).
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inadequate for the services performed, or entirely absent.76 This premium is a familiar 
concept to those in business and finance, where riskier investments command higher 
rates of return than safer ones.
 Chief among the risks attending litigation include the possibilities that (1) the 
client fires the attorney before recovery but after significant work has been undertaken; 
(2) the client demands that the attorney accept a low settlement offer from the 
opposing party, or rejects a reasonable offer in favor of risky litigation; (3) the 
applicable law changes during the pendency of the case; (4) the case is lost; (5) the 
case is won, but the award is minimal; and (6) the award is adequate, but the defendant 
is unable to pay it.
  2. Competing Views of Risk and the Reasonableness of Contingent Fees
 Imagine that a drunk driver injures an indigent laborer, a video recorder captures 
the entire episode, and the drunk driver’s insurance company typically settles such 
claims. Imagine further that the injured laborer seeks and obtains representation at 
the standard, one-third contingency rate. Finally, it is apparent at the outset that the 
case will require minimal effort by the victim’s attorney, and involves little risk. Does 
this fee arrangement pass ethical muster? What does the generally accepted 
requirement that an attorney’s fee be “reasonable” mean vis-à-vis risk? Is a standard, 
fixed-percentage contingent fee always proper, or is a dynamic fee, i.e., a percentage 
sensitive to the degree of risk inherent in the matter, preferable or even required? The 
answers depend on whether one adopts the aggregative- or individual-case view of 
reasonableness.
 a. The aggregative view. Proponents of the aggregative view believe that those 
who criticize the fee charged to the injured laborer have the wrong focus—a 
microanalysis of a particular case, rather than a macroanalysis that applies 
“reasonableness” and ethical considerations at a more general level. While the fee in 
a particular case might appear unreasonably high, the attorney maintains a portfolio 
of cases with varying degrees of risk that, to some degree, offset one another.77 Thus, 
what seems a windfall in one case is actually a subsidy for another indigent client 
who may have a harder offensive to mount. Viewed in the aggregate, the attorney is 
performing a form of redistribution of costs among clients to ensure that all have 
adequate representation.
 The aggregative view has garnered some support within the plaintiffs’ bar, 
though it has no prominent academic support and its critics are legion. One critic 
contends that this justification of the aggregative view does not exist in practice, 
despite protestations to the contrary, and that in any event the justification is 
unethical. First, he claims there “is simply no empirical evidence to support the 
76. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 735–36 (1987) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting on other grounds) (This premium “compensates for the risk of non-payment if the suit does not 
succeed.”).
77. See Kritzer, supra note 18, at 11 (characterizing the contingency fee caseload as a form of portfolio 
management).
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proposition that lawyers use their windfall fees to subsidize other clients,” as 
“[c]ontingency fee lawyers generally do not accept high-risk cases where the likelihood 
of prevailing is small.”78 By undertaking careful screening, attorneys eliminate the 
very cases that this justification of the aggregative view assumes counsel would 
accept. Second, he argues that the aggregative view is “inconsistent with attorneys’ 
fiduciary obligation to deal fairly with each individual, existing, client.”79
 Brickman’s first objection to the aggregative view may be sound in practice, but 
it sidesteps a serious theoretical question. Suppose that some lawyers do in fact take 
on at least some cases where the risk-reward ratio is not necessarily favorable to the 
attorney, on the theory that losses could be recouped by charging other clients a fee 
greater than their particular risk classifications warrant. In these situations, should 
such subsidization be prohibited, as Brickman contends? The answer, in part an issue 
of redistributive justice, depends on one’s political philosophy.
 b. The individual-case view. Proponents of the individual-case view believe that a 
microanalysis of reasonableness is appropriate—that contingent fee pricing must be 
sensitive to the risk posed in each particular case. It is important to note that this 
view is consistent with a form of subsidization, though not the type contemplated by 
the aggregative view. To illustrate this point, suppose a bank lends money to ten 
borrowers of equal creditworthiness, and each is given the same interest rate. If one 
defaults, any risk premium he has paid in the form of interest is of little use to the 
bank—it will not come close to compensating the bank—for the loss of principal 
upon default. Who does make the bank whole? Other borrowers, who do in fact pay 
both principal and interest, essentially cover the loss because the interest rates they 
are charged include both a compensation-for-the-use-of-money component and a 
risk component. The risk component of the interest on these other loans, in the 
aggregate, makes the bank whole for the loss from the defaulting borrower. Without 
this “cover,” bank lending would be unprofitable and impracticable.
 Arguing that the attorney cannot charge the client a premium to cover some loss 
from another is akin to arguing that the bank cannot include a risk component in the 
interest rate it charges all borrowers as a cover for the loss from a defaulting borrower. 
Such an argument threatens the existence of contingent fee arrangements, and 
consequently, representation for the poor. One cannot have it both ways—enabling 
contingent economic arrangements while maintaining absolute individual-client-
oriented ethics. In condemning the subsidization inherent in the aggregative view, 
proponents of the individual-case view believe that individual-client ethics is 
inconsistent not with charging a risk-based rate, but with charging a rate greater than 
one commensurate with the risk posed by an individual client. Because interest from 
some borrowers—usually specifically tailored to the particular risks they pose—will 
78. Brickman, supra note 35, at 283.
79. Brickman et al., supra note 5, at 23. The contingent fee lawyer could argue that implicit in any client’s 
consent to the contingent arrangement is an understanding that the fee may be used to subsidize another 
client. Whether such an understanding exists in the case of each particular client is, of course, debatable, 
and doubtful.
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cover losses from others, individual-case contingent fee lending contains elements of 
aggregation and subsidization, though permissibly so.
 The ABA, the Restatement,80 and most state courts that have considered the 
matter have adopted some form of the individual-case view. In Maynard Steel Casting 
Co. v. Sheedy, one of many plaintiffs in a settling class action lawsuit hired a lawyer 
on a contingency basis to recover its portion of the settlement.81 The extent of the 
attorney’s efforts was to “mail claim information and supplemental claim information 
to the claims administrator,” resulting in payment of some $400,000 to the plaintiff.82 
The attorney retained roughly $136,000 in legal fees.83 The Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin found the fee unreasonable and affirmed reduction of the attorney’s 
recovery to $4200.84 The court noted that “the fee was not justified by the time and 
labor, amount of money, or attendant risks involved.”85
  3. Re-assessing Risk and Reasonableness
 Assuming, as the individual-case view does, that the contingent fee charged must 
be tailored to the risk inherent in each particular case, when is that risk to be assessed? 
To what extent may courts consider the reasonableness of a fee percentage or amount 
based on circumstances not known until after execution of the retainer agreement?86
 It would, at first glance, appear that any tribunal reviewing the reasonableness of 
a fee agreement should, as did the parties to that agreement, consider only the 
circumstances that existed at the time the agreement was reached. It is odd, to say 
the least, to think of analyzing risk ex post, i.e., once it is clear whether the risk has 
in fact materialized. Despite the apparent validity of this basic and intuitive principle, 
there exists a considerable body of case law that neglects it. For instance, the Arizona 
Supreme Court once stated that a “contingent fee, proper when contracted for, may 
later turn out to be excessive,” and held that, “if at the conclusion of a lawyer’s services 
it appears that a fee, which seemed reasonable when agreed upon, has become 
excessive, the attorney may not stand upon the contract; he must reduce the fee.”87 
This holding inappropriately places a particular view of professional ethics over 
economic reality in a manner that threatens to raise the cost of contingent legal 
services; to insure against the risk of ex post downward adjustment, the attorney—
who cannot know ex ante which cases run this risk—must charge all clients a higher 
80. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389 (1994); Restatement 
(Third) of Law Governing Lawyers: Contingent-Fee Arrangements § 35 cmt. c (2000).
81. 746 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
82. Id. at 819. 
83. Id.
84. Id. at 824.
85. Id.
86. The analysis in this section is concerned with potential assessment only of the risk component of the 
contingent fee, not the compensation-for-the-use-of-money component.
87. In re Swartz, 686 P.2d 1236, 1243 (Ariz. 1984).
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fee. This view is akin to forcing life insurance companies to return premiums to 
clients who do not die while covered—a practice that would spell the end of an 
industry that serves a useful social purpose.
 The Arizona Supreme Court is not alone in subscribing to this misguided view. 
In In re Gerard, an attorney was hired on contingency to locate and recover certain 
missing certificates of deposit that his client believed were stolen.88 Shortly after 
executing the fee agreement, the attorney discovered that the certificates had not 
been stolen and simply required re-registration.89 Upon re-registering them, the 
attorney sought to collect the contingent fee.90 Ordering the attorney suspended from 
practice for one year, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the agreement should 
have been reformed as it “was based on a mutual mistake of fact: that someone had 
stolen the certificates and would either make a claim to them or wrongfully redeem 
them.”91 A closer analysis of the facts suggests that there was no “mutual mistake.” 
The client was not certain that the assets had been stolen, and the attorney had no 
idea what recovery of the certificates, if even possible, might require.92
 An attorney takes a risk the instant she accepts a matter on contingency. The 
case may require years of effort and produce no recovery. It may resolve itself within 
minutes of acceptance through no effort of the attorney. It may, as most cases do, fall 
somewhere in between these two extremes. Assuming that she prices the risk at an 
appropriate level considering all facts known to her at the time the agreement is 
reached, the attorney’s contingent fee should be upheld. The attorney must be 
compensated for taking risk, or she will not take it. While it seems distasteful to 
allow an attorney to collect a large contingent fee in a case where victory proves to be 
all but assured shortly after retention, consider that the attorney generally does not 
enjoy the ability to rescind a fee agreement should success prove more elusive than at 
first expected.93 It would be unfair to force attorneys to revisit fee levels in winning 
cases, but not allow them to do so in losing cases.94 The effect of such a system would 
be simply to drive up overall contingent fee percentages, and it is highly unlikely that 
88. 548 N.E.2d 1051, 1052–53 (Ill. 1989).
89. Id. at 1053.
90. Id. at 1053–54.
91. Id. at 1052, 1057.
92. See id. at 1052–53.
93. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 427 (D.N.J. 1993) (“Having contracted with [client] 
on a contingency fee basis, [attorney] cannot now walk away from the contract because the case may not 
generate the return it expected at the outset . . . . Contrary to [attorney]’s suggestion, profitability is not a 
‘basic assumption’ of a contingency fee contract.”). One could argue that there is in fact an instance in 
which an attorney may permissibly withdraw from unprofitable litigation: an attorney retained on 
contingency who discovers at any point in the litigation that it lacks merit is positively required to withdraw 
from the matter. Thus, it may be that clients should be granted some analogous rights identical in scope 
should it prove impossible for the attorney to recover anything less than full compensation.
94. Conversely, in jurisdictions that permit an attorney to withdraw from representation that is, in some 
measure, unprofitable, the client should, absent a discount in the contingent fee charged to ref lect this 
power, enjoy a mutual privilege. See, e.g., Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 630 A.2d 820, 831 (N.J. 
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the authorities advocating ex post analysis in the name of client welfare would 
countenance a general fee increase.
 None of this is to say that ex post analysis cannot be permitted. The point, rather, 
is that all economic effects must be understood and deemed acceptable. Thus, a 
legislative or judicial body is of course free to impose on attorneys an un-waivable 
obligation to conduct certain minimal discovery, aimed at ensuring that a matter is 
indeed controversial, before a fee is assessed, provided the attorney is aware of the 
requirement and is permitted to price her services accordingly. Similarly, society may 
legitimately determine that the harm to a particular client who is charged a 
retrospectively excessive fee is greater than the harm wrought on all winning clients 
who are charged a slightly higher fee to insure against this risk. However, neither 
courts nor legislatures can insist that attorneys accept greater obligations or risks 
without granting attorneys the power to assess additional fees.
 B. Incentives, Control, and the Principal-Agent Problem
 The attorney-client relationship is one of agency: the principal (client) contracts 
with the agent (attorney) to accomplish a certain task for a fee. Ideally, the interests 
of principal and agent should perfectly align. In practice, this is rarely the case. As a 
result, there exists a body of literature exploring various ways to structure agency 
relationships so as to approximate perfect interest-alignment. A notable and heavily 
analyzed example is executive compensation.95
 In the attorney-client context, agency problems arise in many forms. Some, such 
as those attending case settlement or discharge of the attorney, present dual agency 
and risk issues. Those problems are discussed in the next section. Others, unique to 
agency issues, are addressed first.
  1. Comparing the Hourly and Contingent Fee, and Getting the Best of Both Worlds
 The contingent fee rewards an attorney for a successful result, but can encourage 
minimal effort and sub-optimal client (but not attorney) recovery. An attorney has 
incentive to pursue a recovery for each individual client that maximizes the ratio of 
the attorney’s contingent fee to hours expended, perhaps at the expense of a greater 
recovery for the client. This problem is illustrated below in the context of settlement. 
Alternatively, the hourly fee rewards an attorney for effort and time expended, but 
can discourage timesaving and is not as result-oriented as the contingent fee. Given 
this polarity, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain perfect interest-alignment.
 Kevin Clermont and John Currivan suggest a fee structure that is designed to 
approach optimal alignment. They propose a hybrid method of compensation that 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (noting that under certain circumstances an attorney may be able to withdraw 
from a contingent fee representation for “unreasonable financial burden”).
95. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. of Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation 
(June 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=163914.
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combines contingent and hourly fees, called the “contingent hourly-percentage fee.”96 
Under the proposal, “[t]he dollar amount of the proposed contingent fee would be 
computed by adding (1) the lawyer’s time charge for the hours worked to (2) a 
percentage (say five or ten percent) of the amount by which the gross recovery exceeds 
that time charge.”97 This proposal, through its two components, rewards both effort 
and success.
  2. Calculating Contingent Fees so as to Reduce Interest Misalignment
 a. Percentage of gross or net recovery? If an attorney recovers an award for her client, 
should the attorney’s contingent fee percentage be applied to the gross recovery or 
only to the portion of recovery that the client ultimately receives after costs and 
expenses have been paid?
 Calculating fees from net proceeds ensures that the client obtains some 
compensation and incentivizes cost-cutting.98 This is one way to reduce misalignment 
of attorney and client interests, and to improve agency control. William Hodes relates 
variants of the following examples, which illustrate this point:99 In the first variant, 
an attorney recovers $60,000 in a personal injury action. The attorney spent $45,000 
on medical expert reports and depositions. After taking the attorney’s one-third 
contingent fee—$20,000—off the gross recovery, and subtracting medical expenses 
from the remainder, the client is left owing $5000! Had the attorney subtracted her 
fee from the net recovery, the client would have recovered $10,000. In the second 
variant, an attorney recovers $60,000 in a personal injury action. The attorney, 
utilizing effective cost-cutting measures, incurred only $15,000 in expert medical 
expenses, and thus, after subtracting the expenses from gross recovery, and taking a 
one-third contingent fee—$15,000—off the net recovery, the client recovers $30,000. 
Under a percentage-of-the-gross system, it is argued, the attorney lacks direct 
financial incentive (as opposed to a reputational and attendant indirect financial 
incentive) to rein in excess spending and ensure that the lawsuit has practical value to 
the client. The attorney’s incentive would, rather, be to err on the side of increasing 
the chance of victory, no matter what the cost, because she does not share in that 
cost. Under a percentage-of-the-net regime, the attorney, who can retain a portion 
only of the client’s post-expense recovery, has direct financial incentive to minimize 
96. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 13, at 537.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Lan v. Ludrof, No. 1:06 CV 114, 2008 WL 763763, at *23 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2008) (approving 
award of counsel fees based on percentage of gross recovery, and noting that in certain securities actions, 
an attorney’s fee award may only be had of the client’s net recovery); In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 752, 771 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“[T]he Court chooses to subtract the expenses 
before awarding Lead Counsel its fee award. The net recovery more truly approximates the amount of 
money that benefits the Class.”).
99. W. William Hodes, Cheating Clients with the Percentage-of-the-Gross Contingent Fee Scam, 30 Hofstra 
L. Rev. 767, 767–72 (2002). “To allow the lawyer to receive the same fee as if he had achieved the same 
result without the expenditure of client resources is to reward inefficiency and to break apart the 
community of interests that the contingent fee is supposed to promote.” Id. at 772.
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those expenditures, though not to the extent of unduly endangering her client’s case, 
which might result in no fee for the attorney.
 The claim that under a percentage-of-the-gross system an attorney lacks direct 
financial incentive to avoid profligate spending may be overly broad. It is the attorney, 
after all, who will advance the expenses for the client, and thus has some incentive to 
minimize the amount of her own money that she puts at risk.
 Additionally, it is not always clear what constitutes excessive spending. For 
instance, it may not be clear to the attorney in a personal injury action whether a 
local medical expert will suffice or whether an expensive, nationally renowned expert 
is necessary, and the client may not wish the attorney to cut costs through such a 
gamble. Thus, while a percentage-of-the-net regime minimizes perverse incentives, 
the extent of the practical effects of a gross regime is unclear.
 b. Structured awards. Successful plaintiffs are not always paid a lump sum of money. 
Sometimes, they are paid in installments over some period of time and the period may 
or may not be definite. Such structured awards raise questions regarding the calculation 
and timing of payments to attorneys. These issues, and the cases analyzing them, 
generally arise in the absence of contractual provisions in the attorney-client retainer 
agreement that normally would dictate particular resolutions.
 First, should the attorney be paid in one lump sum, or in installments at the same 
intervals as when the client receives her own award? Although courts are divided, a 
majority favors the former.100 Those authorities favoring the latter approach claim it is 
necessary to ensure that the attorney has adequate incentive to obtain the payout schedule 
most favorable to the client. These authorities believe true interest-alignment is obtained 
when the form and timing of payment are the same for both attorney and client.
 Second, is the attorney to be paid a fee based on the present or the future value of 
the award? An award of $100,000 payable immediately has an equivalent present 
value, while an award of $100,000, to be paid to the client without interest in ten 
annual installments of $10,000 each, is presently worth considerably less than 
$100,000. Those courts holding that contingent fees are to be paid once, and up 
front, generally hold that the amount awardable under a contingent fee agreement is 
calculated using the present value of the award.101
 C. Hybrid Risk and Agency Issues
  1. Discharging the Contingent Fee Attorney
 One risk that the contingent fee lawyer faces is being fired by the client at any 
stage before disposition of the case. A majority of jurisdictions permit a client, 
100. See Ravsten v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 736 P.2d 265 (Wash. 1987) (majority view); Sayble v. 
Feinman, 142 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (minority view); Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers: Contingent-Fee Arrangements § 35 cmt. e (minority view). Typically, 
under the majority view, the defendant is required to pay the attorney’s lump-sum fee, as the client will 
not yet have recovered anything with which to pay the attorney.
101. E.g., Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. v. Smith, 532 S.E.2d 815, 824 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
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without penalty, to discharge an attorney with or without cause.102 Most jurisdictions 
have practices in place to adequately protect the attorney in such a situation, though 
these practices are not homogeneous, and some create agency problems. Consider the 
following variations: 103
i.  The discharged attorney recovers in quantum meruit (the fair 
market value of the services he has rendered, not the benefit 
conferred) regardless of the client’s success in the underlying 
matter.104
ii.  The discharged attorney recovers in quantum meruit only if the 
client is successful in the underlying matter.105
iii. The discharged attorney recovers under the contingent fee 
percentage, provided that the client is successful in the underlying 
matter.106
iv.  The discharged attorney may elect immediate compensation in 
quantum meruit (independent of future success or failure) or 
potential future compensation under the contingent fee percentage 
if the client is successful in the underlying matter.107
 The “overwhelming tendency” of courts in cases of discharge is to use the 
quantum meruit method of compensation, and thus not allow recovery based on the 
contingent percentage.108 Some jurisdictions vary the practice used based on the stage 
of the matter and the amount of work already performed at the time of discharge. 
For example, in the District of Columbia, “an attorney who enters into a contingent 
fee agreement with his client, substantially performs, and is then prevented by his 
client from completing performance is entitled to the full amount specified in the fee 
102. See, e.g., Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 174 (1916), amended by, 220 N.Y. 653 (1917).
103. See generally Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee When the Client Discharges a Contingent Fee Attorney, 41 
Emory L. J. 367 (1992).
104. See, e.g., In re Estate of Callahan, 578 N.E. 985, 987 (Ill. 1991); Skeens v. Miller, 628 A.2d 185, 186–87 
(Md. 1993).
105. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1022 (Fla. 1982); Plaza Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 
636 S.W.2d 53, 60 (Mo. 1982).
106. See, e.g., Action Law, S.C. v. Habush, Habush Davis & Rottier, S.C., 592 N.W.2d 319, 1999 WL 47585, 
at *1 (Wis. App. 1999). Courts have employed various methods to allocate contingency awards among 
successive attorneys. See James E. Towery and Julia M. Hollenback, Dividing Attorney Fees Among 
Successive Attorneys—Settled and Unsettled Areas of Law Under Fracasse, 33 Lincoln L. Rev. 105, 108–09 
(2005–2006).
107. In re Downs, 363 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. 1963).
108. Robert L. Rossi, 1 Attorneys’ Fees § 3:12 (3d ed. 2002–2008).
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agreement.”109 Where the “attorney renders less than substantial performance . . . 
quantum meruit [is] the appropriate measure of damages.”110
 Use of the first and fourth practices listed above may obviate the need for the 
portion of a risk premium that is based on risk of discharge, as the risk of non-
recovery f lowing from discharge may be avoided. Where the second and third 
practices prevail, an attorney’s contingent percentage should include some premium 
to insure against the risk that the client’s new attorney bungles the case or otherwise 
fails to obtain the same recovery that the discharged attorney would have. On the 
other hand, if an attorney is discharged and the client finds another attorney who 
“rescues” the case, the discharged attorney receives the unearned benefit of the fee 
f lowing from recovery, based on the skill of the new attorney, which the discharged 
attorney might not have been able to obtain on her own.
 Potential drawbacks of the various practices abound. First, where the discharged 
attorney’s quantum meruit compensation is independent of the client’s success in the 
underlying matter, the client, who is often unable to afford representation in the first 
place absent a contingent arrangement, would have to bear the burden of legal fees 
even if unsuccessful, and the attorney could have the perverse incentive to be 
discharged if recovery becomes unlikely.111
 Second, when recovery is in quantum meruit, but is dependent on the client’s 
success in the underlying matter, two possible perversions exist: In one possible 
scenario, the product of an attorney’s hourly rate and the number of hours worked 
may exceed the fee that the attorney would have obtained under a fixed percentage 
upon contingency, thereby permitting the attorney to recover a greater fee than would 
be received had she not been discharged. Thus, some have suggested that in these 
jurisdictions, quantum meruit should be capped at the amount of contingent payment 
had the client not discharged the attorney.112 In a second possible scenario, a client 
who acquires information indicating that the defendant is very likely to offer an 
acceptable settlement has incentive to discharge the attorney, forcing her to be paid 
in quantum meruit instead of the more profitable contingent fee.113
 Third, as previously discussed, if the discharged lawyer is paid only upon success 
in the underlying matter, and unless this risk is built into the contingent fee normally 
charged, the discharged attorney unfairly bears the risk that the client’s new attorney 
may perform more poorly than she would have.
 Fourth, while the election-of-remedies option described in the fourth practice 
above does not suffer from the following shortcoming, an election doctrine that 
allows an attorney to choose between quantum meruit and contingent percentage 
109. Kaushiva v. Hutter, 454 A.2d 1373, 1374 (D.C. 1983).
110. Id. at 1374; see also Barret v. Freise, 82 P.3d 1179, 1194 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
111. Assuming, of course, that the client has any money with which to pay the attorney’s quantum meruit 
fee.
112. E.g., Plaza Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53, 59–60 (Mo. 1982).
113. Omri Ben-Shahar & Robert A. Mikos, The (Legal) Value of Chance: Distorted Measures of Recovery in 
Private Law, 7 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 484, 499 (2005).
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recovery at the end of the suit, as opposed to the time of discharge, must be eschewed.114 
Under such a regime, the attorney’s risk would be reduced, without a concomitant 
reduction in the price of her services. The attorney initiated representation on the 
basis that success would be rewarded with a percentage of recovery and failure would 
earn no fee. By virtue of being discharged, the attorney is guaranteed the highest 
possible payment. If the suit is unsuccessful, the attorney will be paid at least in 
quantum meruit. If the suit is successful, the attorney can recover the contingent 
percentage. The attorney, then, has a perverse incentive to be discharged as a way of 
hedging against the risk of non-recovery while ensuring maximal remuneration.
  2. Settlement
 Other risks faced by an attorney being paid on contingency are that a client 
rejects a sensible settlement offer in favor of riskier litigation, or forces acceptance of 
an unreasonably low offer. It is, after all, the client’s decision, and not the lawyer’s, 
that governs acceptance or rejection of settlement.115 It is thought that these are some 
of the risks justifying a risk premium.
 This position is not without controversy. 116 Brickman argues that in practice, the 
attorney heavily inf luences, if not completely dominates, the settlement decision. 
Consider the following perversion, all the more pernicious when the lawyer dominates 
the settlement decision: The attorney has incentive to accept an early settlement offer 
when it is thought that the marginal- and opportunity-costs of obtaining each 
additional dollar of recovery are not worth the attorney’s time or effort. As the case 
progresses, the ratio of hours expended to money recovered may increase significantly, 
and the attorney must forgo other cases where quick settlement is likely and the ratio 
lower.
 To illustrate: Suppose that in the typical personal injury action, an attorney is 
able to obtain a $10,000 settlement offer for her client after ten hours of work. 
Suppose further that with an additional twenty hours of work, including more 
extensive negotiation and evidentiary investigation, the attorney would be able to 
114. Ben-Shahar and Mikos suggest that at least one court applies such a rule. See id. at 500 (“Therefore, if 
the award the client eventually collects is high, the attorney may elect the benefit-based measure of 
recovery, namely, a fraction of the client’s award; otherwise the attorney may elect the cost-based 
measure of recovery, namely, the hourly fee.”). However, the case they cite implies that the election 
would occur at the time of discharge, not at the end of suit. See In re Downs, 363 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. 
1963) (“In such event, if the lawyer has a contingent contract and is without fault, he has the election to 
claim a reasonable fee for the work done, as upon a mutual rescission, or to wait until the claim is 
liquidated by judgment or settlement and then sue (if necessary) for his contract fee.”).
115. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(a) (2004).
116. See Brickman, supra note 35, at 284; MacKinnon, supra note 52, at 196 (“Although theoretically the 
client has the control over such decisions, as a practical matter it is usually handled by the attorney.”). 
Brickman cites a survey and study by the Rand Corporation, the results of which tend “to disprove the 
myth, implicit in traditional tort approaches, that individual litigants exercise control over their own 
cases and that intimate contact and consultation between lawyers and clients forces lawyers to respond 
faithfully to their clients’ wishes.” Brickman, supra note 35, at 284 (quoting Deborah R. Hensler, 
Resolving Mass Toxic Torts; Myths and Realities, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 89, 92–97 (1989)).
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extract a $25,000 offer from the opposing party. Finally, suppose that the attorney 
has only thirty hours of time to spend, and that there are numerous potential cases 
available to the attorney presenting the same payout ratios. An individual client’s 
welfare is maximized when the attorney spends the entire thirty hours on that client’s 
matter, recovering $25,000. The lawyer’s welfare is maximized by taking three cases 
and devoting only ten hours to each. The former situation yields compensation to the 
lawyer equal to the contingent fee percentage of $25,000, while the latter yields 
compensation equal to the fee percentage of $30,000. Thus, while the latter situation 
represents the best economic use of the attorney’s time, it also represents a sub-
optimal level of recovery for the individual clients.
 Assuming, though, that clients do exercise some control over settlement 
decisions—and surely there are instances when they do—what is a lawyer to do 
when the client is unreasonable in either refusing an acceptable settlement offer or 
demanding acceptance of a low one? Courts have given a client-friendly answer: the 
attorney must abide by the client’s wishes, even at the cost of the attorney’s fees. The 
following view is typical:
The attorney is of course not entitled to be paid . . . on the basis that the suit 
should or could have been settled. The cause of action is the client’s. If his 
purpose is not to cheat his attorney, he may, completely unfettered by any 
agreement with or relationship to the attorney, litigate or settle as he wills or 
whims. On the other hand, the attorney, in a measure, continues to be bound 
by the contract of retainer. His fees (being by agreement contingent upon 
such “sums received or recovered by [the client] by suit, settlement or 
otherwise”) cannot be computed on the agreed percentage of that sum which 
the client might have received by way of settlement had the lawyer’s advice 
been accepted.117
While this position seems harsh, the attorney can insure against this risk by adding 
an appropriate premium to the fee charged to all winning clients.
 It is unclear whether an attorney may contractually circumvent these limitations 
and provide, in the retainer agreement, for compensation in the event the client does 
not follow the attorney’s advice regarding settlement. In an ethics opinion, the 
Philadelphia Bar Association stated that a lawyer would be permitted to include a fee 
conversion provision in the retainer agreement “if a clear objective is specified in the 
agreement and full disclosure is provided to the client.”118
117. Matarrese v. Wilson, 118 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9–10 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1952) (citations omitted); see also 
Miller v. St. Louis Car Co., 14 S.W.2d 464, 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) (plaintiff ’s counsel entitled to 
percentage of settlement amount only, where plaintiff awarded $900 at trial and, upon defendant’s 
appeal, plaintiff settled for $300 without informing his attorney); Kay v. Home Depot, Inc., 623 So.2d 
764, 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (The attorney obtained $40,000 settlement offer but withdrew one 
week before trial when client refused settlement, the attorney believing that at trial the claim would be 
valued for substantially less. Replacement counsel obtained $45,000 settlement, and client accepted. 
The court held that the initial attorney was not entitled to any fees.). 
118. Phila. Bar Ass’n, Op. 2001-1 (2002), available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/
EthicsOpinion2001-1?appNum=2&wosid=taZWfZvScKZF1cPmJcxTkw.
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 For example, with proper disclosure and contractual language, an attorney and 
client may agree that the representation’s objective is to secure monetary relief on a 
contingency fee, and that if the client deviates from this objective and instead 
demands acceptance of injunctive relief only, the fee is to be computed on an hourly 
basis. It is unclear how such an agreement would fare in other states. For instance, 
the New York County Lawyers’ Association has opined that a lawyer in a personal 
injury matter may not contract with her client for a shift from contingent to hourly 
fees if the client refuses a settlement offer the attorney believes should be accepted.119 
This could, but need not, be interpreted to foreclose the option left open by the 
Philadelphia Bar Association. The most that can be said is that, if permissible, the 
existence of a fee conversion provision would warrant a reduction in risk premium 
charged.
  3. Reverse Contingent Fee Arrangements
 Contingent fees are not just for plaintiffs’ counsel. Defendants have also sought 
to utilize the economic and interest-aligning benefits of such arrangements. In the 
typical reverse arrangement, a defendant facing monetary liability pays his attorney a 
percentage of the amount by which the attorney is able to reduce liability from an 
established baseline.
 The ABA has approved the use of reverse contingent fees in appropriate 
circumstances.120 Such an arrangement is permitted provided that “the amount saved 
is reasonably determinable, the fee is reasonable in amount under the circumstances, 
and the client’s agreement to the fee arrangement is fully informed.”121
 In Brown & Sturm v. Frederick Road Ltd. Partnership, a law firm was successfully 
sued for legal malpractice and failure to disclose material facts necessary for its clients 
to make an informed payment decision based on misconduct in a reverse fee 
arrangement.122 The clients had been assessed $60 million in tax liability, but the 
matter was eventually settled for $20 million.123 Choosing $60 million as the baseline 
exposure, the law firm demanded some $4.8 million pursuant to a reverse contingent 
fee agreement.124 The appellate court, affirming judgment for the clients, held the 
fee unreasonable given that the law firm knew or should have known that the initial 
tax liability assessment was inf lated, and that actual potential liability was much 
lower.125 This case illustrates the most important yet challenging aspect of structuring 
reverse contingency arrangements—establishing an appropriate baseline of liability.
119. NYCLA Comm. on Prof ’l Ethics, Formal Opinion No. 736 (2006), available at http://www.nycla.org/
siteFiles/Publications/Publications286_0.pdf.
120. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-373 (1993).
121. Id.
122. 768 A.2d 62 (Md. App. 2001).
123. Id. at 70, 72.
124. Id. at 72.
125. Id. at 87–89.
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V.  thE pErVasiVE prObLEM Of UnrEasOnabLE COntingEnt fEE priCing, and 
MOdELs fOr rEfOrM
 A. The Problem
 With the number of lawyers already high and still increasing,126 one might have 
thought that contingent fee lawyers would compete with one another and thus reduce 
the price of legal services—that the invisible hand of the market could prevent and 
curb pricing abuses. That does not seem to be the case. There is compelling empirical 
evidence that contingent fee pricing is largely insensitive to factors such as risk.127 In 
fact, many courts note the prevalence of “standard” contingent fee percentages,128 a 
phenomenon inconsistent with reasonable pricing.
 Brickman suggests a number of reasons for the lack of competition, including: 
client ignorance of the value of his or her claim, inherent risks in litigation and 
differing competence levels of attorneys, and a lack of attorney price advertising.129 
In fact, ethical regimes that prohibit price advertising in order to protect clients from 
being misled and to maintain an air of “professionalism”130 may in fact have the 
perverse effect of disabling competition and increasing the cost of legal services. 
Competition is also hindered by psychological phenomena such as price signaling:131 
some believe that the more expensive a product or service, the more likely it is to be 
of relatively high quality.132 While this belief may be justified in a competitive and 
efficient market, it is often invalid in an uncompetitive one.
126. According to the ABA, in the United States, there were 1,162,124 active lawyers in 2008 and 1,180,386 
active lawyers in 2009. National Lawyer Population by State, http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/
publicdocuments/2009_natl_lawyer_by_state.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2010). In 2000, there were 
1,066,328 lawyers. Clara N. Carson, The Lawyer Statistical Report: The U.S. Legal 
Profession in 2000 27 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/pdfs/lawyer_
statistical_report_2000.pdf.
127. See Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 
Cardozo L. Rev. 65, 78 (2003); see also MacKinnon, supra note 52, at 187. MacKinnon reports that 
the personal injury claimant “usually is presented with a standard form contract (frequently printed) and 
the assurance, either express or implied, that the customary or scheduled fee rates are a ‘given’ in the 
situation.” MacKinnon, supra note 52, at 187. Further, “[w]hile some claimants ‘shop around’ for a low, 
competitive price, this is the rare exception.” Id.
128. See, e.g., Freeman v. Mayer, 95 F.3d 569, 570 (7th Cir. 1996) (referring to “standard one-third contingent 
fee”); King v. Fox, No. 97 CV 4134, 2004 WL 68397, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2004) (“A one-third 
contingency fee is standard throughout the state and country.”).
129. Brickman, supra note 127, at 77.
130. MacKinnon, supra note 52, at 4 (“[T]he financial rewards to the lawyer are so large as to encourage 
competitive solicitation of potential clients, impairing the professional disinterest necessary to sound 
advice to his client and weakening the ties between fellow lawyers which form one of the essential 
characteristics of a profession.”).
131. See Brickman, supra note 127, at 101–02.
132. See, e.g., Hilke Plassmann et al., Marketing Actions Can Modulate Neural Representations of Experienced 
Pleasantness, 105 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 1050, 1050 (2008) (“[I]increasing the price of a wine increases 
subjective reports of f lavor and pleasantness.”); Eitan Gerstner, Do Higher Prices Signal Higher Quality?, 
22 J. Mktg. Res. 209, 209 (1985).
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 In the class action context, the lead counsel auction is one attempt to create a 
competitive market. It has also been suggested that the market mechanism can be 
trusted in corporate matters paid on contingency, as corporate clients are often 
sophisticated legal consumers who understand the value of their claims and possess 
the ability to solicit competitive bids from legal service providers.133 The issue, then, 
is how to increase competition in pricing for the benefit of unsophisticated clients.
 B. Models for Reform
  1. Market-Based Solutions
 a. Indirect price competition through alternative financing arrangements. It would be 
sensible for some plaintiffs to borrow money and pay hourly fees to prosecute their 
claims, rather than pay the exorbitant rates charged by contingency lawyers. Some 
plaintiffs might have adequate credit to obtain regular bank loans, while others could 
obtain credit only by using the lawsuit as collateral. Thomas Miceli suggests that a 
market for loans using lawsuits as collateral does not exist because lenders would 
have the same difficulty as clients in valuing claims and risk.134 The problem that 
Miceli notes, though, may not apply in certain cases where valuing legal claims is not 
difficult, such as claims arising out of an airline accident.
 In contrast to the assignment-like financing that characterizes the arrangements 
described below, in the usual bank loan the borrower must repay the loan regardless 
of any contingency, and the collateral is not the preferred form of payment. I shall 
call this arrangement a “typical bank loan.” One reason for the lack of typical bank 
loans secured by lawsuits could be that such lending, often riskier than that secured 
by physical property, may require interest rates that exceed statutory caps for loans. 
The atypical, assignment-like lenders discussed below make the obligation to repay 
contingent upon recovery and not absolute in order to circumvent prohibitions on 
usury.135 As Douglas Richmond notes, “[i]f repayment is based upon a contingency, a 
transaction is more like an investment or a joint undertaking than a loan,” and there 
are no artificially imposed limitations on investment returns.136
 A plaintiff would be better off with a typical, non-contingent bank loan secured 
by her lawsuit than with a contingent fee arrangement only if the sum of the interest 
on the loan and the attorney’s aggregate hourly fee is sufficiently lower than the 
contingent fee percentage of the client’s recovery. By “sufficiently,” I mean not just 
nominally lower, but low enough to compensate for the value of the non-recourse 
protection afforded by the contingent fee arrangement. Whether this situation 
133. Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 Colum. 
L. Rev. 650, 671–72 (2002).
134. Thomas J. Miceli, Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?, 23 J. Legal Stud. 211, 224 n.27 
(1994).
135. See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 Mercer L. Rev. 
649, 665 (2005). Usury is the illegal act of charging an interest rate for a loan above that permitted by 
law. Id.
136. Id.
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actually would obtain with any frequency is not entirely clear, though it is likely to do 
so in low-risk litigation. To enable typical bank lending for lawsuit prosecution, 
legislators may need to reform statutory interest rate caps for loans that may be riskier 
than a bank’s physical-property-collateralized loans, and thus permit arrangements 
that could benefit both borrowers and lenders, rather than force clients to undertake 
through contingent fee arrangements the functional equivalent of borrowing at 
potentially higher interest rates.
 There is a nascent market for litigation financing, although not of the “typical” 
variety. Consider the following two (non-exhaustive) potential markets for legal 
claims in which a personal injury plaintiff wishes to sell his claim and potential 
recovery so as to immediately obtain a sum certain (“assignment-like” financing). In 
the “pure market,” a third party is able to purchase the claim and take over prosecution 
of the action, such that the client cedes to the purchaser control over the suit and 
entitlement to any amount recovered. In the “partial market,” a third party is able to 
purchase the rights to a portion (or all) of any recovery in the matter, but the plaintiff 
and his non-contingent-fee attorney retain control and decisionmaking authority 
over the suit.
 The pure market offers a competitive alternative to contingent fee pricing when 
the purchase price of the claim is greater than the recovery in the suit less an attorney’s 
contingent fee. Nonetheless, a number of common law doctrines effectively preclude 
development of a pure market for buying, selling, and trading in legal claims.137 
These include rules that prohibit assigning claims to others, as well as the doctrines 
of “barratry, maintenance, and champerty, which prohibit a stranger to a controversy 
from, respectively, inciting litigation, assisting in prosecuting litigation, and agreeing 
to take over litigation.”138 A number of scholars argue that a pure market for claims 
is useful and should be legal.139 The primary economic benefit of a pure market is 
that those who purchase and subsequently litigate claims are likely to be sophisticated 
legal consumers who are able to obtain competitive prices for legal services and 
effectively monitor their attorneys’ behavior. These economic benefits could inure to 
137. One must distinguish a market for legal claims from a market for legal pricing. The discussion earlier 
about competition among lawyers to reduce the contingent percentages they charge clients does not 
involve impermissible assignments of or interests in claims.
138. Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 Yale L. J. 697, 699 (2005) (footnote 
omitted). Abramowicz provides a detailed analysis of the philosophical and economic arguments for and 
against a prohibition on alienating legal claims. Id.; see also McKellips v. Mackintosh, 475 N.W.2d 926 
(S.D. 1991) (voiding agreement between bank officer and borrower for loan to fund patent infringement 
prosecution in exchange for a percentage of recovery).
139. For the argument that creating an expansive market for purchasing, selling, and trading tort claims is 
currently prohibited, but that the prohibitions are obsolete, unjustified, and counter-productive, see 
generally Peter Charles Coharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 Yale J. on Reg. 
435 (1995); Isaac Marcushamer, Selling Your Torts: Creating a Market for Tort Claims and Liability, 33 
Hofstra L. Rev. 1543 (2005); James E. Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The “Acquisition 
of an Interest and Financial Assistance in Litigation” Rules, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 223 (2003). For the 
suggestion that attorneys self-interestedly promote anti-assignment rules, see Samuel R. Gross, We 
Could Pass A Law . . . What Might Happen If Contingent Fees Were Banned, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 321, 
327–30 (1998).
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the advantage of consumers, particularly through competition among pure-market-
claims purchasers.
 The partial market offers a competitive alternative to contingent fee pricing 
whenever the lender’s payment to the plaintiff, less the attorney’s aggregate hourly 
fee, is greater than the full recovery less the attorney’s contingent fee.140 Richmond 
has examined this type of litigation funding and concluded that under certain 
conditions it is ethical, legal, and useful.141 Currently, though, the partial market is 
not price-competitive with contingent fees.142
 b. Optimization under the current regime. The market for litigation financing is 
still in its infancy, perhaps bound by what some consider an ill-informed and 
overprotective parent that refuses to let it mature. Current rates for existing non-
recourse litigation funding are not promising. At such high rates, lenders hardly 
provide a competitive alternative to contingent fee arrangements. It is possible that as 
the market for lawsuit lending develops, the interest rates assessed will decrease. 
Additionally, if litigation financers in the partial market for claims were able to 
bundle their loans, securitize them, and trade the securities on an open market, it 
would increase the availability and reduce the cost of litigation funding. It may be, 
though, that true reform will come only from proliferation of a pure market for 
claims.
 Efforts to introduce new forms of litigation financing should be part, but cannot 
be the entirety, of contingent fee price reform. First, a legal claim is unlike a home or 
vehicle. It is neither fungible nor otherwise standard. An individual legal claim may 
be hard to value, and it is not clear that a robust market will ever exist for individual 
claims.143 Second, partial market and typical bank lenders must contend with most of 
the risks a contingent fee attorney would normally face, in addition to the risk of lack 
140. This assumes that the client uses the advance to pay the attorney’s hourly fees, rather than an advance 
arrangement where the attorney is still retained on a contingent basis.
141. See Richmond, supra note 135, at 681–82. In addition to analyzing traditional issues such as maintenance 
and champerty, Richmond also discusses issues of confidentiality (in disclosing aspects of the case to a 
lender), conflicts of interest imposed by a lender, and fee-sharing problems. Id.; see also Susan Lorde 
Martin, Financing Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (And Legal) Business, 33 U. Mich. J. L. 
Reform 57 (2000).
142. See, e.g., Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003) (effective interest 
rate over 100%). These loans may be useful for reasons having little to do with competitive pricing, and 
the current discussion only considers utility qua pricing. For instance, these loans help clients who, for 
whatever reason, need immediate liquidity and would suffer harm by having to wait until the end of suit 
to recover, even if the recovery would be larger than the pre-recovery advance.
143. In discussing the economics of a market for claims, Abramowicz notes that even if legal, “[t]here are 
reasons, however, to think that the market in legal claims would be thin.” Abramowicz, supra note 138, 
at 743. While Abramowicz raises many good points to support this proposition, his discussion of the 
adverse selection problem is incomplete. Arguing that, in theory, claimants who agree to sell their 
claims “will not be a random sample of all parties, but those who anticipate that buyers will most 
overvalue their claims relative to other claims,” id., Abramowicz fails to consider that where standard 
contingent fee percentages remain high, those with valuable claims are likely to sell them so as to avoid 
losing a sizeable portion of the recovery to attorneys’ fees.
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of control over the attorney’s conduct and decisionmaking. This could make such 
lending less attractive and more costly. Third, whether typical, partial-, or pure-
market lending is sustainable at rates lower than contingent fee percentages is not yet 
fully known. Further empirical analysis and economic modeling is necessary. Fourth, 
it is unclear if litigation-funding arrangements, in their various forms, will pass legal 
and ethical muster, and, if they fail to, whether law reform is attainable. Fifth, and 
most importantly, it is unclear whether unsophisticated clients would benefit from 
alternative means of litigation financing. A client who lacks the sophistication to 
aggressively price-shop for legal representation probably lacks the sophistication to 
obtain financing. Proliferation of litigation-financing alternatives might increase 
public awareness of the need to shop for price, just as the proliferation of banks and 
brokers seems to have done for mortgage lending. Much remains to be seen.
 As things currently stand, the best an individual client can do to create a 
competitive market for pricing is to identify, through referrals and basic research, a 
core group of attorneys who are arguably competent to handle the client’s matter, and 
propose to each that the client’s business will go to the lowest bidder. The problem 
with this method, sensible as it may seem, is that the client runs the risk that the 
lawyer he chooses will focus less on the client’s case and more on other cases whose 
rates of return are higher, and thus more profitable, for the lawyer. Absent proper 
monitoring, this risk can only be avoided by ensuring that all other clients are being 
charged similarly low (fair) rates. This is added reason for increased legislative and 
judicial regulation.
 Potential clients could also use the Internet creatively. It might be sensible to 
create an auction site for legal services, with representation requested by the client so 
as not to run afoul of prohibitions on attorney solicitation of clients. The site could 
utilize attorney-written questionnaires to elicit from each potential client important 
basic facts about his case.144 Attorneys could follow up with the potential client, 
inquiring as to any additional facts necessary, and then submit contingent-fee-
percentage proposals. Potential clients could then choose among the offers, 
144. Some courts have held that information provided by potential clients on attorney-written questionnaires 
is privileged. E.g., In re Auclair, 961 F.2d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[C]ommunications made in the course 
of preliminary discussions with a view to employing the lawyer are privileged though employment is 
not . . . accepted.”); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 
1978) (“The fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client extends to preliminary consultation 
by a prospective client with a view to retention of the lawyer, although actual employment does not 
result.”); Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., No. 06-1743, 2006 WL 3420591, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2006) 
(“Where courts have specifically addressed the discoverability of questionnaires completed by putative 
class members, the dispositive factor typically is whether the putative class members were seeking legal 
advice or representation at the time they filled out the questionnaires.”); Vodak v. City of Chi., No. 
03 C 2463, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 532, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2004) (“[T]he persons who completed 
the form questionnaires reasonably believed that they were consulting counsel in their capacity as 
lawyers and they completed the questionnaire for the purpose of requesting legal representation.”). But 
see Morisky v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 191 F.R.D. 419, 423 (D.N.J. 2000) (“[The plaintiff ’s law 
firm] cannot establish that the . . . employees who completed the questionnaires were clients or sought 
to become clients at the time the employees returned the completed . . . questionnaires.”).
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presumably taking the best offers from lawyers with whom the clients are 
comfortable.145 While rudimentary, this option should be explored.
  2. Value-Added Contingent Fee
 Brickman’s proposed solution to contingent fee abuse is a value-added contingent 
fee, which works as follows: Before the expiration of two months after the plaintiff 
retains an attorney, both plaintiff and defendant are to provide basic yet minimal 
discovery, and the defendant is then given an opportunity to make a settlement offer. 
Should the defendant make such an offer, the plaintiff ’s attorney is paid a contingent 
fee based on the value added by her services—the amount that the attorney is able to 
recover for the plaintiff above the initial settlement offer. If the defendant does not 
make any settlement offer at that time, it is presumed that the defendant anticipates 
a fair chance of success, and thus there is enough risk to the plaintiff to justify 
charging a contingent fee on any amount recovered. If the defendant makes a 
settlement offer and the plaintiff accepts, the attorney is limited to an hourly fee for 
the representation.146
 While Brickman’s proposal ensures that the client pays a contingent fee only 
when real value is produced, it does not ensure that the fee is commensurate with the 
risk involved in the representation. The proposal is also limited to the extent that 
defendants are unable or reluctant to submit settlement offers before significant 
investigation and discovery has occurred. The ABA has rejected the proposal.147
  3. Case-by-Case Scrutiny
 Some suggest that contingent fee abuses can be curbed through case-by-case 
judicial scrutiny of fee arrangements and awards.148 They point to judicial regulation 
of fees in the class action context as an exemplar. Brickman contends that such 
scrutiny would be impracticable (and perhaps impossible), as some million new 
contingency cases are filed each year, and only a small fraction are actually litigated 
and thus come before a judge.149
145. Some might object to this proposal on the ground that clients may have no way of knowing whether 
attorneys who submit bids are competent. This objection, even if true, does not necessarily militate 
against the proposal. It assumes that clients who locate and retain attorneys through traditional means 
possess greater knowledge of the competence of the attorneys they hire. It also assumes that any 
informational benefits attending traditional methods of retaining attorneys could not be imported to 
the Internet. This too may not be true. For example, auction sites like eBay have effectively implemented 
reputational ratings for buyers and sellers. On the other hand, the types of services (e.g., rapid shipment) 
reputational rankings on eBay rate are much simpler than legal services.
146. See Brickman et al., supra note 5, at 24–28.
147. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Opinion 94-389 (1994).
148. E.g., Philip H. Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual ’s Key to the Courthouse Door, 2 Litig., Summer 
1976, at 27, 35.
149. Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates, and the Disciplinary System: The Case Against 
Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1339, 1349–51 (1996).
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 Others suggest that abuses can be adequately monitored and addressed using the 
traditional disciplinary mechanism of oversight by each jurisdiction’s attorney 
disciplinary committee. Brickman, however, argues that, for a number of reasons, 
disciplinary committees do a poor to non-existent job of punishing and deterring 
abuse. First, the descriptive proposition that standard contingent fees are general and 
widespread is mistakenly taken to bear normative implication. That is, people use the 
descriptive claim that a 33% contingent fee is “normal” or “standard” as a normative 
justification for its propriety. Disciplinary cases generally are heard only if a client 
files a complaint—a rarity.150 With industry-standard contingent fees, there is no 
baseline from which a client can judge fee excesses, and thus know when to complain. 
Second, while disciplinary committees can, unlike many courts, exercise jurisdiction 
over ethical lapses in legal matters settled without resort to litigation, few do. Many 
disciplinary committees fail to even recognize contingent fee abuses as ethical lapses, 
either viewing them as fee disputes to be referred to confidential fee arbitrators or as 
entirely unproblematic.151
  4. Capping Fees
 Some jurisdictions have enacted ceilings on the percentage of a client’s recovery 
an attorney may retain as a contingent fee, generally “barring rates above 50%.”152 
Some jurisdictions have enacted sliding-scale measures of maximum contingency 
percentages that depend on the amount of recovery or stage of litigation in which the 
case terminates.153
 Capping fees can have unintended consequences. First, while it may seem 
intuitive to enact a low cap for a fairly minor, low-risk matter, this could have the 
effect of precluding potential representation, as the attorney’s fee would not be worth 
the effort or time necessary to obtain it.154 The dollar amount of these claims may be 
so nugacious as to merit disregard, but others, at the very least those on the margin, 
might be financially significant to the client but insignificant to the lawyer at the 
capped rate. These marginal cases (and, since “marginal” is a relative term, it is 
unclear just how few they might be) would fall to the wayside if the fee were capped 
too low. Second, and more importantly, to the extent that caps are insensitive to the 
risk involved or effort required in a particular case, they are crude, and threaten to 
preclude contingent representation in very risky or labor-intensive matters. 155 After 
all, the problem is not purely one of a higher fee, but rather of a fee insensitive to risk 
150. See Ted Schneyer, Legal-Process Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyers’ Contingent Fee Contracts, 47 
DePaul L. Rev. 371, 400 (1998) (“[C]lients, with their recoveries fresh in hand, rarely see any basis for 
complaining that their lawyers’ fee were excessive.”).
151. See generally Brickman, supra note 149 (reporting cases and discussing results of survey).
152. Brickman et al., supra note 5, at 17; see, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 7 (2009).
153. See, e.g., Rules Regulating the Florida Bar: Rules of Prof’l Conduct § 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) (2010).
154. See Contiguglia & Sorapure, supra note 8, at 701.
155. Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 813, 834 (1989).
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or difficulty. While legislatively and popularly tempting, this procrustean measure is 
economically unsound.
  5. Working Together for Reform
 As the reader has likely gathered, no single proposal is perfect, and none standing 
alone can reform contingent fee pricing abuse. True reform only can result from a 
concerted effort. This effort should include further development of litigation 
financing alternatives, increased judicial and disciplinary committee scrutiny of fees, 
educational campaigns aimed at informing clients that fees need not be standard and 
that clients should negotiate with their attorneys and solicit more than one “bid” for 
representation,156 and adoption of a value-added regime.
Vi.  dO COntingEnt fEE arrangEMEnts prOMOtE LitigatiOn, and dOEs it 
MattEr?
 Whether reasonably priced or not, critics of the contingent fee have for years 
castigated it as a device by which frivolous and excessive litigation is promoted.157 
This assessment, however, largely misses the mark. Recall that Brickman noted in 
his critique of the aggregative view of an attorney’s contingent fee caseload that 
subsidization of very risky cases does not occur because attorneys carefully screen 
cases for merit. These comprehensive screening processes have been empirically 
documented.158 Their consequences are considerable.
 Initially, a move from hourly to contingent fees may increase the quantity of 
cases, insofar as it opens the courthouse doors to parties who would otherwise have 
been unable to afford to litigate.159 To those who have a general, visceral distaste for 
156. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Need a Lawyer? Judge for Yourself (June 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/products/pro14.shtm (“The size of a contingency fee, usually a percentage of 
any money you receive to resolve the case, is always negotiable . . . . The size of the contingency fee 
should ref lect the amount of work that will be required by the attorney. Some cases are straightforward; 
others can be novel or uncertain.”).
157. See, e.g., Edith Greene et al., “SHOULDN’T WE CONSIDER . . . ?” Jury Discussions of Forbidden Topics 
and Effects on Damage Awards, 14 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 194, 197 n.2 (2008) (in the public eye, 
contingency fees are “perceived as encouraging the filing of frivolous lawsuits”); Yu-Hsin Lin, Modeling 
Securities Class Actions Outside the United States: the Role of Nonprofits in the Case of Taiwan, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. 
& Bus. 143, 179 (2007) (“Under the allure of contingency fees, lawyers, being the major beneficiaries of 
the settlements following frivolous litigation, bring up all potential lawsuits, regardless of their merit, to 
maximize their ‘portfolio’ gains.”); Paula Batt Wilson, Attorney Investment in Class Action Litigation: The 
Agent Orange Example, 45 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 291, 297 n.35 (1994) (“Contingent fees are banned in 
most foreign countries to avoid frivolous litigation . . . .”).
158. See Kritzer, supra note 18, at 67–89.
159. However, for those lawyers who insist that certain hourly fee clients who are able to afford litigation 
remunerate them instead on a contingency basis, the shift might decrease the quantity of litigation, as 
these lawyers will be less willing to accept risky cases. This assumes, though, that the clients would have 
been willing to pay an hourly fee in risky cases. It also assumes that some lawyers would rather be 
compensated on a contingency basis, even when the client can afford to pay a regular fee, because of the 
possibility of high returns.
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litigation, this increase is deleterious. Assuming, as one should, that society should 
object only to frivolous litigation, the real issue is whether contingent fee arrangements 
decrease the quality of litigation. As stated by the court in Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 
“[t]he excitement of suits is an evil, when suits are unjust; but when right is withheld, 
and the object of the suit is just, to promote the suit, is to promote justice.”160
 Economic modeling suggests that contingent fee arrangements reduce frivolous 
suits when compared to hourly fee arrangements.161 The reasoning is simple: When 
an attorney’s compensation is based solely on success, as opposed to hours billed, 
there is great incentive to accept and prosecute only meritorious cases.162
 At least one empirical analysis concludes that “hourly fees encourage the filing of 
low-quality suits and increase the time to settlement (i.e., contingency fees increase 
legal quality and decrease the time to settlement).”163 One problem with this analysis 
is its measure of case quality: “the probability that the plaintiff drops the case without 
either a settlement or award. A drop . . . occurs when the plaintiff unilaterally decides 
not to pursue the case any further.”164 In the hourly fee context, a drop may in fact 
ref lect a plaintiff ’s growing assessment that the expected return from prosecuting 
the matter is less than the expected cost. However, a drop also may reflect a plaintiff ’s 
mere inability to continue to finance the litigation. With a thin market for litigation 
financing, many plaintiffs who are not in upper-socioeconomic classes would be 
forced to drop meritorious cases as legal fees mounted. Counting such drops as 
ref lective of case quality is wrong. It is unclear what percentage of drops ref lect 
actual low case quality, and thus what conclusion to draw from the data.
 The authors respond that “liquidity constraints” fail to account for the increase in 
drops under the hourly fee: first, for liquidity constraints “to explain an increase in 
drops would require that plaintiffs fail to foresee at the time that their case begins 
that their funds will be insufficient to carry the case forward;”165 second, if liquidity 
constraints are indeed common, the time to settlement should decrease under hourly 
fees, as plaintiffs would demand early resolutions to their cases. In fact, the study 
revealed that time to settlement increased when contingent fees were limited, thus 
negating a significant explanatory role for liquidity constraints.
160. 3 Cow. 623, 643 (N.Y. 1824).
161. See Miceli, supra note 134, at 223 (“[W]hen the threat of frivolous litigation is highest . . . the hourly fee 
actually results in more frivolous suits and higher total litigation costs.”).
162. There are still situations where an attorney paid on contingency would accept a low-quality suit. The 
attorney’s expected return from any lawsuit is the sum of the product of the probability and value of 
each possible outcome. The greater the possible reward, the less likelihood of success necessary to justify 
accepting the representation. Thus, a low-quality suit with the potential for a very large recovery might 
still be worth pursuing, even on contingency. See David E. Bernstein, Procedural Tort Reform: Lessons 
from Other Nations, 19 Reg. 71, 79 (1996) (contingent fee arrangements “encourage[] attorneys to engage 
in speculative litigation in the hope of landing an occasional large jackpot”).
163. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Contingency Fees, Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality Litigation: 
Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets, 19 J. L. Econ. & Org. 517, 517 (2003).
164. Id. at 521.
165. Id. at 539.
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 The authors’ response is problematic. First, it is entirely possible that a plaintiff, 
particularly an unsophisticated one, would fail to appreciate the full cost of litigation 
at its commencement. Second, in the hourly fee context, liquidity constraints can 
actually lengthen the time to settlement, such as when a client requires additional 
time to obtain funds to further finance the litigation.
 The debate over whether contingent fees increase or reduce frivolous litigation 
continues, and further empirical analysis is necessary to resolve this important 
question. However, the popular view of the contingent fee as promoter of frivolousness 
is, at the very least, dubious.
Vii. COnCLUsiOn
 Contingent fee arrangements are useful and important, but they must be 
structured so as to track risk, increase interest-alignment and minimize perverse 
incentives and effects. Additionally, courts and legislatures must understand the 
economics behind such arrangements. Toward these ends, this article has presented 
the case for reforming certain aspects of contingent fee practice, and has offered 
suggestions for reform. By following this advice, and appreciating opposing views in 
contested areas, society can move closer to a just and economically efficient system of 
contingency representation.
